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REDEFINING THE PRIVATE CLUB:
NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION,
INC. v. CITY OF NEW YORK,
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988)
The first amendment of the United States Constitution implicitly
guarantees the right to freedom of association.' Private associations
defend their discriminatory policies by claiming the right to associate2
and the right to privacy.3 Recently, courts have used public accommo-
dation laws to narrow the scope of associational rights and to increase
the role of the government in eliminating discrimination.4 In New
1. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1010 (1988) (stating that the Supreme
Court considers the freedom of association to be a preferred right derived by implica-
tion from the express first amendment guarantees); see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (noting that the right of association is necessary to make the
express guarantees of the first amendment meaningful); see also infra note 24 (discussing
interpretations of the first amendment).
2. See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct.
1940, 1945 (1987) (Rotary International claimed that the fellowship enjoyed by male
members is protected by a constitutional right of association); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing that freedom of association receives pro-
tection as a fundamental element of personal liberty).
3. The fourth amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be
secured in their persons, houses, paper, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at
483 (noting that the right of privacy extends to groups as a right of association); but see
Burns, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and
the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 347 (1983) (arguing that
the right to privacy does not include the right to exclude women from clubs).
4. See Note, Rotary International v. Duarte: Limiting Associational Rights to Protect
Equal Access to California Business Establishments, 19 PAC. L.J. 399 (1988) (discussing
the evolution of antidiscrimination laws and their effect on private clubs). Courts have
broadly interpreted the meaning of "public accommodation." E.g., United States
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (holding the Jaycees to be a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of the state statute); United States Power
Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 465
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York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York 5 the United
States Supreme Court held that the City6 may constitutionally restrict
discririination in certain business-oriented private clubs.7
In New York State Club Association (NYSCA), the City Council of
New York City passed Local Law 638 banning discrimination in busi-
ness-oriented clubs9 that are not distinctly private."0 The law provides
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1983) (holding boating clubs to be places of public accommodation). For
sources providing a comprehensive list of 39 states which have public accommodation
laws, see infra notes 41-42.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
6. See Local Law No. 63 of 1984 § I app. at 14-15. The law amends New York
City's Human Rights Law, a public accommodation law which forbids discrimination
based on race, creed, sex, and other grounds by any "place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement." N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § B1-2.0(9) (1976). The Human Rights
Law includes hotels, restaurants, retail stores, hospitals, laundries, theatres, parks, pub-
lic conveyances, and public halls. Id. at § 8-102(9) (1986). However, the law exempts
from its coverage "any institution, club, or place of accommodation which proves that it
is in its nature distinctly private." Id. Local Law 63 provides:
An institution, club, or place of public accommodation shall not be considered in
its nature distinctly private if it has more than four hundred members, provides
regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space,
facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of
nonmembers for the furtherance of his trade or business. ... [B]enevolent orders
... [and] ... religious corporations shall be deemed in nature distinctly private.
Local Law No. 63 of 1984 § 1 app. at 14-15.
7. 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
8. The City Council passed the law after determining that professional women did
not have an equal opportunity to succeed in business because influential private clubs
imposed all-male membership restrictions. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2230. The City Coun-
cil found that the public interest in equal opportunity outweighed the interest in private
association asserted by club members. Thus, the City Council found this interest suffi-
ciently compelling to justify any incidental infringement on associational rights. Id.
But see Brief of NYSCA at 7, New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York,
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836) (arguing that the requirements adopted by Local
Law 63 will not necessarily equalize access to the business networking that occurs in
private clubs).
For discussion of the importance of club membership, see Note, Sex Discrimination in
Private Clubs, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 418 (1977) (denying women access to and partici-
pation in private clubs perpetuates women's dependence and inferiority); Note, Dis-
crimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right to Privacy, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1181, 1189 (discussing the difference between business networking in coun-
try clubs and city clubs).
9. Although many private clubs have "understood" rules that forbid the discussion
of politics or business on club premises, such topics are inevitably discussed. Alpern,
Clubs: The Ins and Outs, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 18-19. The Cosmos Club, a
male-only club in Washington, D.C., "prides itself on being the site of discussions that
later develop into public policy." Note, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 29 HAS-
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a three-part test: an association is not "distinctly private" if it has
more than four hundred members,1" provides regular meal service,12
and receives regular payment from nonmembers."3 The law specifi-
cally exempts benevolent orders 4 and religious organizations. 5
NYSCA 16 filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law 63
violated club members' first amendment right of association 7 and their
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. 8 The New
York State Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law.' 9
TINGS L.J. 417, 420 (1977). But see St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 28, 1988, at 1A, cols.
5-6 (reporting that the Cosmos Club voted to end its 110-year-old men-only policy two
days before the NYSCA decision).
10. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2230.
11. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the Supreme Court
established that an organization with more than 400 members was too large and un-
selective to invoke a right of intimate association. Id. at 621.
12. The New York City Commission on Human Rights Regulations (Commission)
defined "regular meal service" as "the provision, either directly or under contract with
another person, of breakfast, lunch or dinner on three or more days per week during
two or more weeks per month during six or more months per year." Brief of NYSC,
supra note 8, at 4 n.2.
13. The Commission defined "regularly receives payment" as "the receipt of as
many payments during the course of a year as the number of weeks the club is available
to members or nonmembers." Id. at 4 n.3.
14. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2230. The court cited N.Y. INS. LAW § 4501(a) (McKin-
ney 1985), which defines benevolent order as one "formed, organized, and carried on
solely for the benefit of its members and of their beneficiaries." NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at
2236.
15. Id at 2230. The court cited N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1987),
which defines religious corporations as those created for purposes of group worship or
observance. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2236.
16. Brief of NYSCA, supra note 8, at 2 (citing GALES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIA-
TiONS (1980)). The NYSCA is an association of 125 private clubs and associations in
the State of New York, a substantial number of which are located in New York City.
More than 60,000 people in New York State are members of formal organizations
which limit their membership on grounds of race, religion, sex, or national origin. Id.
17. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2231. See supra notes 1-2 for text and discussion of the
first amendment.
18. Id. at 2231. NYSCA claimed that the exemption in Local Law 63 for benevo-
lent orders and religious corporations, which deems them "distinctly private" in nature,
violates the equal protection clause. Id. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment states
in pertinent part: "No State shall to any person within its jurisdiction deny the equal
protection of the laws .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. In an unreported opinion, the court found that the law did not violate the first
amendment. Moreover, the City's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination jus-
tified its narrowly drawn regulation of constitutional associational interests. Brief of
NYSCA, supra note 8, at 14.
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Upon direct appeal, both the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York2" and the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York affirmed.2"
The first amendment's implicit guarantee of freedom of association22
fails to delineate the types of association protected.23 Therefore,
courts have interpreted the right of association in the context of other
constitutional amendments24 as well as federal25 and state legislation.26
20. 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1986) (focusing on the law's exemption for
religious corporations and benevolent orders).
21. 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987). The court primarily
addressed NYSCA's contention that the law violated the state constitution because it
conflicted with the State Human Rights Law. The court found that the City Council
could define the term "distinctly private" despite the absence of a state law definition.
Id. at 215, 505 N.E.2d at 919, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 353. In essence, the court concluded
that those clubs which meet the law's three-prong test lose the "essential characteristic
of selectivity" and become "affected with a public interest." Id. at 216, 505 N.E.2d at
920, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 354. Hence, they would no longer qualify as "distinctly private."
Id.
22. See supra note 1 for text of the first amendment.
23. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (discussing the va-
ried interpretations the Court has given the first amendment). See also Kiwanis Club of
Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis Int'l, 52 A.D.2d 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d
383 (1976) (Shapiro, J., dissenting), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1034, 363 N.E.2d 1378, 395
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1977) (stating that it is no enough to define a private club as one which
is not in fact open to the public).
24. See Comment, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional
Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RayV. 460, 465 (1970). The first amendment is one
source of the right to freedom of association that provides a constitutional defense for
private clubs' discrimination. Id. Other sources of the freedom of association right
include the ninth amendment and traditional concepts of substantive due process under
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 465-66. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925) (holding that the due process clause protects first amendment rights against
state abridgement).
See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964). The Court recognized that at
least one facet of the right to freedom of association grows out of the "penumbra" of the
Bill of Rights. Id. at 484. The specific provisions which support the right of intimate
association are: the first amendment (freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and
the right to petition the government); the third amendment (prohibiting the quartering
of soldiers); the fourth amendment (the right to be secure in person, houses, and papers
and the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); the fifth amendment (free-
dom from self-incrimination); and the ninth amendment (retention of rights by the peo-
ple). Id. at 479-99.
25. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the federal
statutory development in the area of private clubs, see Note, Sex Discrimination in Pri-
vate Clubs, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 434-37 (1977).
26. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. See also Note, Private Club Mem-
bership - Where Does Privacy End and Discrimination Begin?, 61 ST. JOHNs L. Ray.
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Courts must balance the right of association and the fourth amend-
ment right of privacy 27 against guarantees of equality in the Constitu-
tion and in legislation.2"
The United States Supreme Court first expressly recognized a consti-
tutional right of association 21 in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. °
In NAACP, the Court formally established that an association could
assert the same first amendment rights as the individual members of
the association.3 1  Applying a close scrutiny standard, 2 the Court
474, 487-99 (1987) (discussing the impact of state public accommodation laws on pri-
vate clubs).
27. See supra note 3 for text of the fourth amendment. A series of bans on govern-
mental interference with certain personal decisions has developed the right to privacy.
E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (freedom from bodily constraint); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (education and rearing of children).
28. See Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82
MICH. L. REv. 1878, 1880 (1984) (discussing the tension between associational freedom
and equality with regard to Roberts).
29. But cf Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court held
generally that the constitutional right to freedom of association does not necessarily
include a right to disassociate from others. 431 U.S. at 227. More specifically, the
Court stated that compelling school teachers to support the political purposes of a
union "works no less an infringement of constitutional rights" than prohibiting teachers
from supporting the union. Id. at 234.
30. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAACP the state attempted to compel the NAACP to
disclose membership lists. Id. at 451. The Court held that such compulsion inhibited
the exercise of the fourteenth amendment right to freedom of self-expression. Id. at
462-63. The Court noted that the freedom to associate for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is "beyond debate." Id. at 460.
31. d at 459. See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. Justice Douglas noted that the
act of joining an organization could itself be a form of expression:
The right of association... is more than the right to attend a meeting; it includes
the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group....
Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not
expressly included in the first amendment its existence is necessary in making the
express guarantees fully meaningful.
Id.
32. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-61. The Court generally applies a strict scrutiny stan-
dard to any state action that attempts to abridge the freedom of association. Id. at 460.
See also R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.41 (1986) (extensively describing the strict scrutiny
test); but cf. M. NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMEMDMENT § 2.05[B][4] (1984). Besides "strict scrutiny," other levels of
scrutiny include "mid-tier" balancing and "rational basis" analysis. But suspicion re-
mains that such labels are not so much prescriptive directions as "shorthand labels for
1989]
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found the interests of the state not sufficiently compelling to justify in-
fringement on freedom of association.33 While the Court in NAACP
established a constitutional right to freedom of association, the Court
failed to articulate the scope of its protection. 34
The federal public accommodation law35 contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 196436 gave broad definition to the associational rights
established in NAACP. The Act, however, had minimal effect on dis-
crimination in private clubs. While the Act clearly prohibits discrimi-
nation in public accommodations, Title II of the Act provides an
exemption for private clubs.37 By failing to define "private," the legis-
lature invited broad interpretation of this term.38 Moreover, the stat-
ute only applies to clubs that affect interstate commerce 39 and does not
extend to sex discrimination.' Although the Act did not have a direct
unarticulated balancing. They simply rationalize the balance once it has been
achieved." NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
33. Id. at 463-64.
34. Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right
to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1194 (1970). The relationship between freedom of
association and express first amendment rights remains unclear. The Court did not
specifically address the type or degree of expression required for protection. In dicta,
the Court suggested that the freedom of association included the right to advance beliefs
and ideas in economic, religious, or cultural, as well as political matters. Id. at 1194.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1982). The public accommodation provision states: "All
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages and accommodations of any place of public accommodation as
defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion or national origin." Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982) states in part:
(e) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities
of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an estab-
lishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
38. See, eg., Garner v. Louisana, 368 U.S. 157, 181 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(stating that the proprietor of a restaurant may not define "public" to include only the
people of the proprietor's choice); Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trust-
ees of Kiwanis Int'l, 52 A.D.2d 906, 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383, 387 (1976) (objecting to a
definition of private club as one which merely bars a portion of the public); Wright v.
Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (describing factors for determin-
ing private clubs under federal civil rights law).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1982).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1982). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides protec-
tion against sexual discrimnation in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982). For a
discussion of the relation between Title VII and state regulations and their combined
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/13
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impact on private clubs, it influenced the drafting of state public ac-
commodation laws.4
State public accommodation laws have imposed the most significant
restrictions on private club discrimination.42 Historically, state legisla-
tion broadly recognized associational interests,4" and virtually all an-
tidiscrimination legislation contained exemptions for private
associations.' Thus, state courts have had to interpret the statutory
terms to determine which organizations fell within these exemptions.
effect on private clubs, see Garcia, Title VII Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Pri--
vate Club Employment Practices, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1107 (1983); see also Bohemian
Club v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1, 231 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1986) (preservation of camaraderie in all-male clubs does not justify sexually discrimi-
natory hiring practices); Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (D. Kan. 1984)
(right of association more limited in employment context than club membership
context).
41. See Comment, The Unruh Act: An Uncertain Guarantee, 31 UCLA L. REv.
443, 445 (1983) (states adopted public accommodations laws in response to Supreme
Court's invalidation of federal public accommodation law). See generally Project, Dis-
crimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommo-
dations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978); Note, The Private Club
Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1112 (1969) (detailed review of developing state standards used to determine sta-
tus of assertedly private clubs within context of racial discrimination actions under Title
Vii).
42. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1988, at IA, col. 5 (reporting states which have public
accommodation laws and noting the laws' success); see also Project, supra note 41, at
264 (providing a comprehensive list of the public accommodation laws enacted in 39
states). The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, is usually
ineffective in contesting discrimination by private clubs because the fourteenth amend-
ment is interpreted to require that acts of discrimination involve "state action." Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 n.1 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
Moose Lodge, a black guest challenged the lodge's refusal to serve him. The plaintiff
conceded the right of a private club to discriminate, but argued that the state's issuance
of a license to sell alcoholic beverages at the lodge was "state action" implicating the
protection of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 171-72. Consequently, the Court did
not have to decide whether a private club could discriminate. Id. at 177-78.
In his dissent, Justice Douglas appeared to support the right of private clubs to dis-
criminate against minorities of all types, but he argued that there was sufficient state
action to bar further discrimination against blacks. Id. at 179-83.
A party can establish state action by showing that the actor is the state or that the
actor occupies a public function. E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
The party can also satisfy the state action requirement by showing a nexus between the
actor and the state, such as state enforcement of a private discriminatory act. Shelly v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
43. Linder, supra note 28, at 1881 (noting that states recognize strong associational
interests by broadly exempting private clubs from antidiscrimination legislation).
44. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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Until recently courts have had minimal guidance in defining the proper
scope of statutory exemptions for private associations.45
The Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees" established
a comprehensive framework to determine which clubs could be exempt
from state public accommodation laws. 7 The Roberts Court held that
the Minnesota Human Rights Act48 compelled the Jaycees to accept
women as regular members.49 The Court distinguished two constitu-
tionally protected associations: intimate associations50 and expressive
associations.51 The Court found that the Jaycees did not qualify as an
intimate association because its activities were substantially open to
nonmembers and because club membership was large and nonselec-
tive.52 The Jaycees also failed to qualify as an expressive association
because it could not prove that admitting women would change the
character of the organization's message.5 3 While the Court in Roberts
established a workable analysis for other courts to follow, it failed to
define specifically the boundaries of constitutionally protected
45. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
46. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
47. I. at 618. The Roberts Court established a three-part analysis for constitu-
tional challenges against freedom of association rights. Id. at 618-31. First, the Court
evaluated the Jaycees' right to intimate association. Id. at 618-21. Next, the Court
considered the Jaycees' right of expressive association. Id. at 621-29. Finally, the Court
balanced any intrusion on the Jaycees' right of expressive association with the govern-
ment's compelling interest. Id. at 629-31.
48. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982). The Act provides in pertinent part: "It is an
unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of a place of pub-
lic accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, or
sex .. " Id.
49. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 630-31.
50. Id. at 618-22. To determine whether an intimate association exists, the Court
considers size, degree of selectivity in admissions and retention, and the need for privacy
in certain key aspects of the relationship. Id. at 620. The Court stated that the Bill of
Rights grants highly personal relationships substantial freedom from state interference.
Id. at 618. The Court intimated that these relationships do not extend far beyond the
family. Id. at 619.
51. Id at 622-29. To establish the defense of freedom of expressive association, the
group must show that it is engaged in a protected first amendment activity such as
political speech, education, or religion. The government must then prove that its inter-
ference is the least intrusive means to further a compelling state interest. Id.
52. See supra note 50.
53. The Court, finding no support in the record, did not address potential changes
in the basic philosophy of the organization which might necessarily result if women
became full voting members. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/13
REDEFINING THE PRIVATE CLUB
associations. 54
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Du-
arte," the Supreme Court refined the freedom of association analysis
presented in Roberts. Applying the Roberts Court's intimate-expres-
sive dichotomy,56 the Court held that California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act5 7 did not violate the Rotary Club's right of association. Rotary
expanded the definition of intimate associations to include a spectrum
of personal attachments and refused to confine the term to family rela-
tions.58 With regard to expressive associations, the Court found no
evidence that the admission of women would unduly interfere with the
present purposes of club members.5 9 Although the Court expanded
the categorical distinctions, it did not specifically limit private associa-
tional rights.
New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York 6
presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to define clearly the
54. Id. at 619-22. The Roberts court merely held that the limits of private associa-
tions fall somewhere on a "spectrum ranging from intimate to the most attenuated of
personal attachments." Id.
55. 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987) (holding that sex discrimination policies violated a Cali-
fornia public accommodation law notwithstanding the freedom of association rights of
Rotary members).
56. Id. at 1945-48. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
57. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982). The Unruh Act reads in pertinent part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business es-
tablishments of every kind whatsoever." Id. Currently, many California all-male clubs
have tried to "privatize" their policies in order to evade the Act's prohibition. To ac-
complish this, the clubs claim they accept personal checks only, permit no business
activity, and screen all nonmembers. Commentary of Herma Hill Kay, The Washing-
ton University School of Law Shelley v. Kraemer Conference (Sept. 30, 1988).
58. Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1946. The Court explicitly stated that it did not limit the
right of private associations to family relations. Id. However, the Court held that rela-
tionships among Rotary Club members were not sufficiently intimate to warrant consti-
tutional protection. Id. The Court reasoned that Rotary Club membership procedures
emphasized unlimited full representation of the business and professional community.
Id. Moreover, Rotary Club sought publicity and joint participation in activities with
other clubs. Id. at 1946-47. Thus, the Court found that the Rotary Club was neither
selective nor exclusive. Id.
59. Id. at 1946-47. The Court found that the Rotary Club conducts significant busi-
ness activity. Also, no evidence indicated Rotary Clubs promote public issues or other
traditional first amendment speech topics. Thus, the Court found that the state's inter-
est in eliminating discrimination against women extended to equal access of leadership
skills, business opportunities, and tangible goods and services. Id.
60. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
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parameters of private associations. Writing for the majority,61 Justice
White granted the NYSCA standing to pursue a facial attack62 on Lo-
cal Law 63, but ultimately denied the challenge.
63
The Court initially addressed NYSCA's contention that Local Law
63 could never be applied in a valid manner." Relying on Roberts and
Rotary, the Court found that the law's antidiscrimination provisions
could be constitutionally applied to at least some large New York
clubs.65 The Court noted that Roberts upheld similar laws regulating
clubs with at least four hundred members66 and that Rotary allowed
restrictions on groups with even fewer members. 7 Additionally, the
Court held valid the law's application to clubs with regular meal ser-
vice and regular nonmember involvement because these provisions
clearly pinpointed clubs with a commercial nature.61 While some clubs
may be entitled to constitutional protection despite the presence of
these characteristics,69 the Court concluded that the law could validly
apply to other associations.7 °
The Court also addressed NYSCA's contention that the law was
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2232 (noting that an association has standing to sue on behalf of its mem-
bers when those members would have standing to bring the same suit).
63. Id. at 2232-35. The Court established that in order to make a facial attack on
the law, NYSCA must prove that the law could never be applied in a valid manner.
NYSCA must also prove that even if the law could be applied validly, it would be so
broad that it would inhibit the free speech of others. Id.
64. Id. at 2233-34. NYSCA contended that because a significant amount of private
or intimate association could occur in clubs meeting the three-prong test, the test failed
to measure adequately a club's nonprivate status. Id. For a review of the three-prong
test, see supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
65. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
66. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). The state law applied to
the Jaycees, which had approximately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters. Id. at
613.
67. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940
(1987). The state law applied to Rotary clubs having less than 20 members. Id. at
1946.
68. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2233. The Court affirmed the City Council's findings that
these two characteristics reflect the degree of business deals and contacts made at clubs.
IdL
69. Id. at 2234. The Court rejected NYSCA's claim that the law created an irrebut-
table presumption that clubs covered under the law are not private in nature, Instead,
the Court allowed for judicial review of administrative enforcement proceedings. Id.
On appeal, courts could make a case-by-case analysis of the facts. Id. at 2235.
70. Id. at 2234.
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overbroad71 because it impaired individuals' rights to associate and to
advocate public or private viewpoints.7 2 Finding that NYSCA could
not prove that the law threatened any particular club's constitutional
rights, the Court rejected the claim.7 3 It noted, however, that future
courts could cure any overbreadth in the law on a case-by-case basis.74
Finally, the Court rejected NYSCA's claim that the law violates the
equal protection clause because it exempts benevolent orders and reli-
gious organizations.75 The Court reasoned that because such groups
did not have the same business proclivity as private clubs, Local Law
63 properly exempted them.76
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court's
conclusion that the facial challenge to Local Law 63 must fail.77 She
wrote separately to emphasize that the Court was not undermining the
importance of any associational interests involved.78 She clarified that
the constitutional right of association does not protect predominantly
commercial organizations.79 Moreover, she noted that when future
courts examine the commercial nature of a club, they should also con-
sider subjective factors - such as an organization's purpose, policies,
selectivity, and congeniality - on a case-by-case basis.80
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority's opinion, but disagreed
with the equal protection analysis.8" He argued that benevolent orders
71. d at 2234-35.
72. Id. The overbreadth analysis applies when a litigant, whose own activities are
unprotected, challenges a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the first
amendment rights of other parties not before the court. See Brief of NYSCA, supra
note 8, at 23. To prove overbreadth in this case, the Court required NYSCA to show
that the law would deny first amendment guarantees to a substantial number of individ-
uals. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
73. Id at 2234-35. The Court upheld the City Council's argument that Local Law
63 does not violate a right of expressive association, since affected clubs may espouse
ideologies basic to their formation or existence and may freely select and exclude mem-
bers on that basis. Id. The Court held that Local Law 63 does not regulate speech but
merely restricts conduct which is not entitled to constitutional protection. Id.
74. Id. at 2235.
75. Id. at 2235-37. See supra notes 14-15.
76. Id. at 2236-37.
77. Id at 2237.
78. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that even if a club falls within the three-prong test,
the Court will permit the club to prove that it deserves constitutional protection. Id
79. Id.
80. Id. See infra note 89 listing an additional subjective factor.
81. Id. at 2238.
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must be more than "unique" to fall within Local Law 63's exemp-
tion. 2 He contended that a reasonable connection must exist between
the special characteristics of the association and the purpose of the
law.8" Justice Scalia supported the Court's decision, however, because
he agreed that the exempted organizations were unlikely to foster busi-
ness transactions.8 4
The NYSCA decision is an important symbolic victory.8, The Court
has given new encouragement and guidance to advocates of similar
laws in other states.8 6 Unlike the broad standards established in earlier
cases,8 7 Local Law 63 enumerates objective characteristics which de-
fine private associations.88 To protect truly private associations that
may fall within the law's three-part test, the Court considered subjec-
tive variables.8 9 By firmly establishing that cities may constitutionally
ban discrimination in private clubs, the decision will affect private as-
sociations nationwide. 90
The NYSCA decision opens the door to professional advancement




85. "This case clears the way for cities in which the city council perceives the same
invidious discrimination that the New York City Council perceived to regulate the so-
called private clubs if they meet these same or similar criteria." N. Y. Times, June 21,
1988, at IA, col. 5 (quoting Benna Ruth Solomon, attorney for the City of New York).
86. See Brief of NYSCA, supra note 8, at 7 n.6, listing some of the municipalities,
including Detroit, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Philadelphia, which have con-
sidered or are considering legislation similar to Local Law 63.
87. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Durante, 107 S. Ct.
1940 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
88. See supra note 6.
89. NYSCA, 108 S. Ct. at 2235. The Court also suggested that an association could
show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes by proving that it will not be
able to advocate effectively its desired viewpoints without confining its membership. Id.
90. Although neither Missouri nor St. Louis has a statute restricting discrimination
in private clubs, the NYSCA decision influenced the well-established Missouri Athletic
Club (MAC) to change its 85-year-old male-only policy and open its doors to women.
St. Louis Post Dispatch, Sept. 17, 1988, at IA, col. 2. The MAC has approximately
5,000 members, offers breakfast, lunch, and dinner seven days a week, and derives part
of its income from businesses that pay for their employees' dues or expenses. Id. St.
Louis Alderman Mary Ross claimed that had the club not changed its membership
policy, she would have proposed legislation. Id.
91. See generally Burns, supra note 3 (discussing public apathy toward the exclu-
sion of women from private clubs).
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women will benefit from the valuable business networking that all-male
clubs foster.92 Opening membership to women does not guarantee that
private clubs will treat women equally once they are admitted.93 Thus,
NYSCA may present merely the first step toward equalizing business
opportunities in private clubs. 94
NYSCA may contribute to greater equality in the workplace at the
expense of impairing the constitutional right of freedom of associa-
tion.95 Future courts might erroneously accept Local Law 63's tripar-
tite test96 as a definitive indicator of a club's nonprivate status.97 Thus,
courts might overlook other important factors which should render the
club constitutionally protected. 98 NYSCA could jeopardize the first
amendment rights of those associations which actually serve expressive
purposes, but incidentally conduct commercial activity.99
The holding in NYSCA exemplifies the growing trend toward re-
stricting discrimination in private associations. The Court, by specifi-
cally defining the scope of the private association, has allowed city and
92. See Burns, supra note 3, at 325-34 (discussing the enormous influence prestigi-
ous clubs provide in business and politics).
93. See Comment, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 417
(1977). In many clubs women were permitted to use club facilities only on specified
days of the week or only during specified hours; in others, women could use only desig-
nated stairways, elevators, and rooms. Id. at 419.
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982), recently
compelled San Francisco's influential Press Club to admit women at the chagrin of its
male members. Expressing their outrage at the new policy, several male members began
swimming naked in the coed pool. Commentary by Professor Herma Hill Kay, The
Washington University School of Law Shelley v. Kraemer Conference (Sept. 30, 1988).
94. Id
95. See Linder, supra note 28, at 1902 (commenting that the power to change an
association's membership is so dangerous that it should not be exercised even where
discrimination may appear unjust).
96. Because the three-prong test is objective and easy to apply, courts may be
tempted to rely on it without considering subjective factors.
97. See Brief of NYSCA, supra note 8, at 20. NYSCA contended that the test was
too superficial and failed to consider that the course of human interactions combines
business, social, and intimate components. Id
98. Iad While the Court stated it would consider other factors, it did not specifically
identify them. But see supra text accompanying note 80 (identifying Justice O'Connor's
consideration of subjective factors).
99. Id. See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In her con-
curring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that many associations cannot readily be de-
scribed as purely expressive or purely commercial. She suggested that the analysis
should focus almost exclusively on whether the activities of the association are predomi-
nately expressive or commercial. Id at 635.
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state public accommodation laws to ban discrimination in business-ori-
ented clubs. Consequently, the Court contributes to establishing
greater equality among all professionals in the business world.
Nancy G. Kornbhm
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